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Background: Our objective was to develop a model for measuring re-identification risk that more closely mimics
the behaviour of an adversary by accounting for repeated attempts at matching and verification of matches, and
apply it to evaluate the risk of re-identification for Canada’s post-marketing adverse drug event database (ADE).
Re-identification is only demonstrably plausible for deaths in ADE. A matching experiment between ADE records
and virtual obituaries constructed from Statistics Canada vital statistics was simulated. A new re-identification risk is
considered, it assumes that after gathering all the potential matches for a patient record (all records in the
obituaries that are potential matches for an ADE record), an adversary tries to verify these potential matches. Two
adversary scenarios were considered: (a) a mildly motivated adversary who will stop after one verification attempt,
and (b) a highly motivated adversary who will attempt to verify all the potential matches and is only limited by
practical or financial considerations.
Methods: The mean percentage of records in ADE that had a high probability of being re-identified was computed.
Results: Under scenario (a), the risk of re-identification from disclosing the province, age at death, gender, and exact
date of the report is quite high, but the removal of province brings down the risk significantly. By only generalizing the
date of reporting to month and year and including all other variables, the risk is always low. All ADE records have a
high risk of re-identification under scenario (b), but the plausibility of that scenario is limited because of the financial
and practical deterrent even for highly motivated adversaries.
Conclusions: It is possible to disclose Canada’s adverse drug event database while ensuring that plausible
re-identification risks are acceptably low. Our new re-identification risk model is suitable for such risk assessments.Background
There is increasing pressure to make raw health data on
individuals more generally available for research, policy,
and commercial purposes [1]. There are also pressures on
governments to disclose more data through Access to In-
formation requests [2]. However, without obtaining the in-
dividuals’ consent a priori for such disclosures, such data
needs to be appropriately de-identifieda.
Recent incidents have demonstrated that publicly avail-
able, and ostensibly de-identified data, can still allow the
re-identification of individuals [3]. In one notable example,
Health Canada’s Adverse Drug Event (ADE) database
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reproduction in any medium, provided the orrenamed [4,5]) was obtained through an Access to Infor-
mation request by a national broadcaster. The national
broadcaster was then able to re-identify a 26 year old
female patient who died while taking a particular medi-
cation by linking her ADE record with the publicly avail-
able obituaries, contacted her family, and broadcast a
story about the adverse effects of that drug referring to the
girl’s death as an example [6]. The publicity coincided with
Health Canada issuing a safety advisory about the medica-
tion in question [7].
Drug and device manufacturers are required to report
adverse reactions to regulators. Otherwise, reporting is
voluntary and comes from physicians and patients. In the
US the equivalent system is AERS (Adverse Event
Reporting System) [8]. Regulators in Canada and the US
make ADE data publicly available through Access to Infor-
mation/Freedom of Information requests [5,9], and these
data have been used by researchers [9,10]. However, as theal Ltd. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
iginal work is properly cited.
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patients whose death has been reported in an ADE data-
base is plausible, and privacy concerns around the dis-
closure of these reports have resulted in lengthy and costly
litigation in Canadian federal court [6].
Given the utility of ADE databases for researchers and
the media, it is important to make the data publicly avail-
able, but in a manner that ensures individual patients can-
not be re-identified. Since measures existing at the time
did not prevent the re-identification of an ADE record by
a national broadcaster, it is important to analyze this at-
tack and prevent similar future re-identification attempts.
In this paper we present a new more general re-
identification risk model that extends previous models by
covering the actual behavior of the broadcaster. The new
model assumes some degree of effort from the adversary in
validating potential matches. The model will be presented
in detail in the next section. We then performed a simula-
tion to evaluate the risk of re-identification of Canadians
from public ADE reports. We focus on reports where the
outcome was death because there is evidence of successful
re-identification attacks where the outcome is death.
Definitions
We start off by providing some definitions that are used in
our model development.
Categories of variables
It is useful to differentiate among the different types of vari-
ables in a disclosed data set. The way the variables are han-
dled when evaluating re-identification risk will depend on
how they are categorized. We make a distinction among
four types of variables [11,12], and these are illustrated in
the hypothetical claims data in Table 1:
Directly identifying variables One or more direct iden-
tifiers can be used to uniquely identify an individual, either
by themselves or in combination with other readily avail-
able information. For example, there are more than 200
people named “John Smith” in Ontario (based on a search
in the White Pages), therefore the name by itself would
not be directly identifying, but in combination with the
address it would be directly identifying information. A
telephone number is not directly identifying by itself, but
in combination with the readily available White Pages it
becomes so. Other examples of directly identifying vari-
ables include email address, health insurance card number,
credit card number, and social insurance number. These
numbers are identifying because there exist public and/or
private databases that an adversary can plausibly get access
to where these numbers can lead directly, and uniquely, to
an identity. For example, Table 1 shows the names and
telephone numbers of individuals. In that case the name
and number would be considered as identifying variables.Indirectly identifying variables (quasi-identifiers) The
quasi-identifiers are the background knowledge variables
about individuals in the disclosed data set that an adver-
sary can use, individually or in combination, to probabil-
istically re-identify a record. If an adversary does not
have background knowledge of a variable then it cannot
be a quasi-identifier. The manner in which an adversary
can obtain such background knowledge will determine
which attacks on a data set are plausible. For example,
the background knowledge may be available because the
adversary knows a particular target individual in the
disclosed data set, an individual in the data set has a vis-
ible characteristic that is also described in the data set,
or the background knowledge exists in a public or semi-
public registry.
Examples of quasi-identifiers include sex, date of birth
or age, locations (such as postal codes, census geography,
information about proximity to known or unique land-
marks), language spoken at home, ethnic origin, aboriginal
identity, total years of schooling, marital status, criminal
history, total income, visible minority status, activity diffi-
culties/reductions, profession, event dates (such as admis-
sion, discharge, procedure, death, specimen collection,
visit/encounter), codes (such as diagnosis codes, proced-
ure codes, and adverse event codes), country of birth, birth
weight, and birth plurality.
For example, Table 1 shows the patient sex and year
of birth (from which an age can be derived) as quasi-
identifiers.
Sensitive variables These are the variables that are not
really useful for determining an individual’s identity but
contain sensitive health information about the individuals.
Examples of sensitive variables are laboratory test results
and drug dosage information. In Table 1 the lab test that
was ordered and the test results are the sensitive variables.
Other variables Any variable in the data set which does
not fall into one of the above categories falls into this ‘catch
all’ category. For example, in Table 1 we see the variable
PayDelay, which indicates how long (in days) it took the in-
surer to pay the provider. In general, this information is not
considered sensitive and would be quite difficult for an ad-
versary to use for re-identification attack purposes.
In the ADE database there were no direct identifiers,
but it does have a number of quasi-identifiers as explained
below. Our focus is on the re-identification risk from these
quasi-identifiers.
Equivalence class
All the records that have the same values on the quasi-
identifiers are called an equivalence class. For example,
all the records in a dataset about 17 year old males are
an equivalence class.
Table 1 Example data: this hypothetical example table is used to illustrate a number of concepts that we use
throughout our analysis
Identifying variable Quasi-identifiers Sensitive variables Other variables
ID Name Telephone number Sex Year of birth Lab test Lab result Paydelay
1 John Smith (412) 688-5468 Male 1959 Albumin, Serum 4.8 37
2 Alan Smith (413) 822-5074 Male 1969 Creatine kinase 86 36
3 Alice Brown (416) 886-5314 Female 1955 Alkaline Phosphatase 66 52
4 Hercules Green (613) 763-5254 Male 1959 Bilirubin Negative 36
5 Alicia Freds (613) 586-6222 Female 1942 BUN/Creatinine Ratio 17 82
6 Gill Stringer (954) 699-5423 Female 1975 Calcium, Serum 9.2 34
7 Marie Kirkpatrick (416) 786-6212 Female 1966 Free Thyroxine Index 2.7 23
8 Leslie Hall (905) 668-6581 Female 1987 Globulin, Total 3.5 9
9 Douglas Henry (416) 423-5965 Male 1959 B-type natriuretic peptide 134.1 38
10 Fred Thompson (416) 421-7719 Male 1967 Creatine kinase 80 21
11 Joe Doe (705) 727-7808 Male 1968 Alanine aminotransferase 24 33
12 Lillian Barley (416) 695-4669 Female 1955 Cancer antigen 125 86 28
13 Deitmar Plank (416) 603-5526 Male 1967 Creatine kinase 327 37
14 Anderson Hoyt (905) 388-2851 Male 1967 Creatine kinase 82 16
15 Alexandra Knight (416) 539-4200 Female 1966 Creatinine 0.78 44
16 Helene Arnold (519) 631-0587 Female 1955 Triglycerides 147 59
17 Almond Zipf (519) 515-8500 Male 1967 Creatine kinase 73 20
18 Britney Goldman (613) 737-7870 Female 1956 Monocytes 12 34
19 Lisa Marie (902) 473-2383 Female 1956 HDL Cholesterol 68 141
20 William Cooper (905) 763-6852 Male 1978 Neutrophils 83 21
21 Kathy Last (705) 424-1266 Female 1966 Prothrombin Time 16.9 23
22 Deitmar Plank (519) 831-2330 Male 1967 Creatine kinase 68 16
23 Anderson Hoyt (705) 652-6215 Male 1971 White Blood Cell Count 13.0 151
24 Alexandra Knight (416) 813-5873 Female 1954 Hemoglobin 14.8 34
25 Helene Arnold (705) 663-1801 Female 1977 Lipase, Serum 37 27
26 Anderson Heft (416) 813-6498 Male 1944 Cholesterol, Total 147 18
27 Almond Zipf (617) 667-9540 Male 1965 Hematocrit 45.3 53
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There are two kinds of disclosure that are of general con-
cern: identity disclosure and attribute disclosure [13,14].
The first is when an adversary can assign an identity to a
record in the data set. For example, if the adversary would
be able to determine that record number 3 belongs to pa-
tient Alice Brown using only the quasi-identifiers, then
this is identity disclosure. The second type of disclosure is
when an adversary learns a sensitive attribute about a pa-
tient in the database with a sufficiently high probability
without knowing which specific record belongs to that pa-
tient [13,15]. For example, in Table 1 all males born in
1967 had a creatine kinease lab test. Assume that an ad-
versary does not need to know which record belongs to
Almond Zipf (record ID 17). Since Almond is male and
was born in 1967 then the adversary will discover some-
thing new about him (that he had a test often given toindividuals showing symptoms of a heart attack). This is
attribute disclosure.
In analyzing the disclosure of the national ADE data-
base, we only consider identity disclosure. There are a
number of justifications for this.
Known re-identifications of personal information that
have actually occurred are identity disclosures [3]. Further-
more, health privacy statutes and regulations in multiple
jurisdictions, including the US Health Insurance Portabil-
ity and Accountability Act (HIPAA) Privacy Rule and the
Ontario Personal Health Information Act (PHIPA) only
consider identity disclosure in their definitions of personal
health information.
In the context of an Access to Information request, as
is the case with Canadian ADE database, if the data cus-
todian did more than was required by law in order to re-
lease less information, they can be taken to court by the
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only on the requirements for managing identity disclosure
risks only.
Conceptual motivation
Measures of re-identification risk make assumptions
about the method of attack that is used by the adversary.
Most work on measuring the risk of re-identification as-
sumes that the adversary will attempt to re-identify a
single record in the disclosed database and then stop.
That single attempt may succeed or fail. The adversary
will use background information that she knows about
someone in the disclosed database or that is obtained
from public and semi-public registries.
In Canada, large public registries with full identity infor-
mation (i.e. names) include obituaries, White Pages, Pri-
vate Property Security Registration, and the Land Registry
[16,17]. These public registries might also include other
information such as the date of death, date of birth, geo-
graphic information about place of residence, and gender.
To illustrate, an adversary can select a record with
unique values from an ostensibly de-identified ADE reports
database which has been disclosed, then check for potential
matches in public registries having full identity information
by matching quasi-identifiers common to both databases.
If there exists one potential match, then re-identification
occurs [18,19]. On the other hand, if more than one poten-
tial match exists, and if the adversary is lacking any add-
itional information, then re-identification with certainty
cannot occur. Subsequently, the adversary might randomly
select one of the potential matches as the final match. In
this case, the adversary would not be certain of the correct-
ness of the outcome, s/he would only have a probability of
success associated with it. In the literature, although a ran-
dom match (with probabilistic outcome) is not generally
considered a re-identification, a low probability of success
is still desired (0.2 is a common requirement [20-29]). The
re-identification risk for an adversary who is content with aTable 2 Example of an extract from an adverse drug reaction
potentially matching extract from an obituary table
Report ID Age Gender Province Report
1 42 F British 5 May
Columbia
2 71 M Alberta 2 Jan 1
3 34 M Ontario 21 Sept
4 55 F Quebec 1 Apr 1
5 38 F Nova 25 Nov
Scotia
6 44 M Ontario 23 Oct
7 65 M Quebec 24 Junrandom match, referred to as the unmotivated adversary,
depends on the size of the population equivalence class,
and has been the focus of previous literature [11,30].
However, as illustrated in the broadcaster example,
some adversaries are not content with uncertain matching.
In the absence of unique matches (i.e., when faced with
several potential matches), such motivated adversaries
might take further measures to verify these matches in
order to confirm the identity of the individual. For ex-
ample, adversaries who are willing to assume some degree
of effort to validate their potential matches could be jour-
nalists chasing a rewarding story, or firms marketing their
medical products where the marketing process is costly
per prospect. For each one of these examples, the degree
of motivation can vary from highly motivated, to mildly
motivated. In each case, the motivation is limited by prac-
tical and financial considerations. This scenario focuses on
certain re-identification and is an extension of the unique-
ness matching scenario.
The outcome of interest in our analysis is death. It is
more difficult to re-identify records with other reported
outcomes (e.g., nausea), and there is evidence that it can
be, or has been, done for death outcomes. In addition to
the Canadian broadcaster example of re-identification
through obituaries, another study presents an example of
how obituary data was used to re-identify uniques in de-
identified pedigrees [18]. Therefore we only focus on
deaths in the ADE database.
The re-identification of records belonging to patients
who have died does not only affect the dignity of the de-
ceased individual, but can also result in an invasion of
privacy to their family and friends. For example, if a pa-
tient dies while taking a drug for a stigmatized infectious
or hereditary disease then that may raise assumptions
that the person’s family and/or friends may also have the
same disease.
Consider Table 2 which shows ADE-like entries, and
Table 3 which shows obituary entries. The quasi-identifiersdatabase where the reported outcome was death, and a
date Drug name Reaction
1998 TALWIN FOR INJECTION Suicide
998 MAXERAN Dehydration
1998 Procainamide Cardiac arrest
998 Rifampin Congestive heart failure
2004 Tegretol Non-accidental overdose
2006 Penicillin Respiratory arrest
2001 Morphine Haemorrhage intracranial
Table 3 Example of an extract from an obituary table
Name Age Gender Province Date of death
John Smith 44 M Ontario 23 Oct 2006
Alan Black 44 M Ontario 23 Oct 2006
Hugh Tremblay 44 M Ontario 23 Oct 2006
Joe White 44 M Ontario 23 Oct 2006
Mary Lambert 65 F Quebec 25 Nov 2004
Leslie Long 77 F British Columbia 24 Jun 2001
We assume that the obituary has all deaths. The names in this table are
fabricated names and do not knowingly match real individuals.
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province, and date of death. In this example we use the
ADE reporting date as a proxy for the date of death.
If an adversary selected the individual in report number
6 in Table 2, then there are four matches in the obituaries.
Lacking any additional information, an unmotivated ad-
versary would select one of these individuals at random
and the probability of having a correct match is 0.25. It is
important to note that in this case, the adversary cannot
know if this match is correct or not, s/he only knows the
probability of the match being correct.
In practice however, for a highly motivated adversary,
such as the national broadcaster it would not be accept-
able to have a breaking story about the wrong person.
Knowing that there is a one in four chance that, say, Alan
Black was the one on Penicillin and died from respiratory
arrest would not be sufficient. Furthermore, the broad-
caster would want to have a story around the specific fam-
ily of the deceased individual. This makes it necessary to
have certainty that the match is correct. Therefore, clearly
such random matching would be insufficient and a
method of verifying the potential matches to determine
the correct one would be necessary.
In practice, the broadcaster will verify the first obituary
match by making a call or visit to the family. If it is deter-
mined from the family that John Smith did not take Penicil-
lin and did not die from respiratory arrest, the broadcaster
would proceed to the family of Alan Black, then Hugh
Tremblay, and Joe White. The ability to verify matches (for
example, the willingness of families to provide personal in-
formation to the broadcaster), and the resources that the
broadcaster has available to verify matches (for example,
the broadcaster may have resources to only verify two
matches and therefore if a correct match is not found
after two attempts, then they would give up and that
would be considered a no match), affects the re-
identification probability.
The broadcaster may not be able to contact a family,
in which case it is not possible to verify a match. The
family may respond but not be truthful with the broad-
caster if they do not want their experiences to be publi-
cized or perceive the broadcaster’s questions to be aninvasion of their privacy. Therefore, the ability to verify a
match is probabilistic.
It is important to note that the re-identification probabil-
ity here is semantically different from the probability of a
random match for an unmotivated adversary. In the case
of a random match, the unmotivated adversary cannot be
certain which of the matches is correct, but can associate a
probability to each match. For the motivated case, it de-
picts the probability of having a certain match, in other
words, it is the probability of the adversary being able to
verify the correctness of one of the potential matches.
There are currently no re-identification risk measures
that take into account the process of multiple matching
attempts with verification. However, some adversaries in
the real world incorporate verification and multiple
attempts in their re-identification process, making it
critical to mimic this actual behaviour in measures of
re-identification risk.Notation
The adversary will match against obituaries. This is rela-
tively easy because there are obituary aggregators and
meta search engines [31-33]. We make an assumption that
there exists a registry of all deaths that is used for
matching by the adversary (the implications of this as-
sumption are discussed in the Limitations section).
The individuals in this obituary are members of the set
Z and the reports in ADE are members of the set U. The
adversary matches on the set of quasi-identifiers that are
common to the ADE database and the obituary. The
discrete variable formed by cross-classifying all values on
the quasi-identifiers is x. Each one of these values is an
equivalence class. The set of equivalence classes is denoted
by J. Let yj denote the value of an equivalence class in J,
such that yj ∊ J. Let xZ,i denote the value of x for individual
i in set Z. For example, if we have two quasi-identifiers,
age and gender, then we may have an individual characte-
rized as xZ,1 = [50, "MALE"]. In this case fifty year old
males would be one of the equivalence classes.
The frequencies for different values of the quasi-
identifiers are given by Fj ¼
XZj j
i¼1
I xZ;i ¼ yj
 
, where I (·)
is the indicator function, |Z| represents the size of the
set Z, and Fj is the size of an equivalence class in the set
Z. Similarly we have f j ¼
XUj j
i¼1
I xU ;i ¼ yj
 
, where ƒj is
the size of an equivalence class in the set U. Some values
of ƒj are zero because not all equivalence classes in the
obituaries will have reported deaths in ADE. In what fol-
lows we assume that ƒj ≤ Fj, and that information is
recorded consistently in both files (i.e., there are no er-
rors or duplicates). Moreover, to simplify our analysis,
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are identical.
For example, consider the hypothetical datasets in
Figure 1. The set U is the ADE database, and this has
four equivalence classes. The first equivalence class of
50 year old males has a size of 4 (i.e., ƒ1 = 4). The fourth
equivalence class of 35 year old females has only a sin-
gle record (i.e., ƒ4 = 1). The Z set is the obituary and
that has 5 equivalence classes. The first equivalence
class of 50 year old males has ten records (i.e., F1 = 10).
Measurement of re-identification risk
In this paper we formulate the re-identification risk for
the motivated adversary who requires matches to be veri-
fied. Re-identification risk is defined as the probability of a
correct match, given the number of verification attempts
the adversary is willing to do. This number depends on
how motivated the adversary is: a mildly motivated adver-
sary might stop after one verification attempt, while a
highly motivated adversary might persist and verify as
many potential matches as possible, limited only by finan-
cial or practical considerations. The formulation of the
risk is a function of the number of verification attempts
the adversary is willing to try.
We denote by P the probability of being able to verify
whether a matching attempt is correct or incorrect. For
example, if the value of P is 1, then the adversary is always
able to verify if a match was correct or not. If the value of
P is 0, then the adversary is not able to verify any match.
The adversary will select a single individual of interest
from the ADE database with value xU,i (most likely xU,i is
chosen to correspond to the smallest equivalence class size
in Z) and will attempt to match this record with theFigure 1 Example to illustrate how the percentage of ADE
records at risk are computed from the matched equivalence
classes. In this example we assume there are only two quasi-
identifying attributes: age at death and gender.individuals in Z. The record selected might have certain
characteristics that are of particular importance to the
adversary (such as died while taking a particular medi-
cine). Denote by Fj the size of the equivalence class in Z
with the same quasi-identifier values as xU,i. We assume
that the adversary has no prior information about any
of the individuals in U. We assume that the adversary
will proceed sequentially through the potential matches
in Fj until the correct match is found (the order of the
records does not matter). If a match is found, then we say
that the adversary stops the verification process. Moreover,
we assume that the adversary will attempt verification for
only one individual. In other words the adversary will stop
the verification process if: (1) a verification is achieved, or
(2) if all possible matches are attempted (Fj attempts) with
no success.
Denote by Pnj the probability that the correct match was
discovered after performing exactly n verifications (note
that n ≤ Fj). Then, we have:
Lemma 1
The probability of finding the correct match at the nth














; if Fj ¼ nþ 1




Note that, particular attention was given for the cases
where Fj ∊ {n-1,n} because:
1. if the adversary performs Fj –1 attempts that all
result in verified non-matches, then there is no need
for any further verifications as this implies that the
last record will be a match.
2. if the adversary performs Fj attempts, and if Fj –1 of
these result in verified non-matches and only one
attempt was unverifiable, then we can deduce the
sole unverified record is the correct match.
The proof is included in Additional file 1.
Now, if we assume that M is the maximum number of
attempts that the adversary is willing to try, and if Mj =
min(M,Fj). In other words, Mj is the maximum number
of attempts that the adversary can perform for class Fj,
either because of his own limitations, i.e., when M ≤ Fj,
or because of the equivalence class size limitation, i.e.
when Fj <M. Then we have:
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The risk of the adversary getting a successful match in Mj
attempts and knowing (through verification) that s/he has












pþ pFj−1 1−pð Þ
1
; if Fj ¼ Mj þ 1
; if Fj ¼ Mj




The proof is included in Additional file 1.
Figure 2 shows the risk Rj as a function of M and P
with Fj =5. Note that for a given P, the risk increases
with the increase in M until M = Fj =5, at that point, Rj
becomes insensitive to the increase in M. Note also that
Rj is very sensitive to the change in the P value, for ex-
ample, for M = 4, Rj jumps from 0.08 at p = 0.1 to 0.85 at
p = 0.9.
If an adversary has substantial resources and will not
stop matching and verifying until s/he goes through all
of the matching records in Z, then we can assume that
Mj = Fj. In our example, the broadcaster was willing to
contact all of the matching records in the obituaries to
determine which was the correct family. In such a case
the re-identification risk is equal to p + p4 (1–p), mean-
ing that the risk depends mainly on the ability to verify
the matches. In fact, with p = 0.9 and Mj = Fj, the risk is
0.965. If the broadcaster has or can afford good staff
who are quite successful at verifying matches, then the
re-identification risk can be quite high.Figure 2 Plot showing how the re-identification risk, Rj, varies with th
verify a match (p).Applications of the risk model
The data custodian can use the above re-identification
risk model to evaluate the risk of re-identification. How-
ever, in applying the model in practice, the custodian
must answer a number of questions. We will address
these questions below.
What type of adversary to assume?
In practice, the data custodian will not know a priori
which type of adversary is most likely: will it be an adver-
sary who is content with an unverified match (assuming
no uniques in the obituaries) or an adversary who needs
to have verified matches. If it is an adversary who will not
verify matches, the probability of re-identification as
presented in [34] is: R′j ¼ 1 Fj

. If the adversary needs to
verify matches, then the probability of re-identification is
given in Lemma 2: Rj.
How can an adversary verify a match?
An adversary can contact neighbourhood businesses and
individuals, and directly call potential matches to verify
if a match was correct. In the case of the press, members
of the public are often willing to reveal information to
reporters in the hope or expectation of being part of the
story. If individuals are not cooperative, many social en-
gineering techniques exist [35-37], and have been used
to obtain very personal information from individuals and
organizations (as well as to commit more dramatic
crimes such as bank robberies) [38,39]. A recent review
of data breaches indicated that 12% of data breach inci-
dents involved deceit and social engineering techniques
[40]. It has been argued that the main threat to medical
privacy is social engineering, and such techniques have
been used by private investigators to surreptitiouslye number of attempts (M) and the probability of being able to
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use social engineering techniques to verify identity by
pretending to be from a bank checking on an unusual
transaction, impersonate someone collecting on a med-
ical bill, pretend to be someone from the health insurer
verifying some details otherwise an insurance policy will
expire or a claim will not be paid, or act as a receptionist
from a hospital/clinic confirming an appointment.
How many verification attempts will there be (M)?
In this paper, we analyse the case of a motivated adversary
who will attempt to verify matches. The number of verifi-
cation attempts depends on the level of motivation. A
mildly motivated adversary might only attempt one verifi-
cation: Mj = 1. While a more motivated adversary might
take further measures to verify potential matches. A highly
motivated adversary might attempt to verify all potential
matches: Mj = Fj.
Who is a motivated adversary? One way to determine
the number of verification attempts by an adversary, M, is
to examine the financial value of the re-identification to
the adversary and assume that the adversary would not
consume more resources on the re-identification than the
information is worth. In the underground economy, the
rate for the basic demographics of a Canadian has been es-
timated to be $50 [43]. Another study determined that
full-identities are worth $1-$15 [44]. However, an adver-
sary will already have access to a public registry with the
identity information to match with. For example, in the
case of the ADE database, the obituaries would contain
the identity information for the individuals, and there is
evidence that such information is sufficient to create new
identities for the deceased individuals and resell them
[45]. The matching with the ADE database does not add
new information. Consequently, we cannot use the value
of identity data as a driver for deciding on M.
The re-identification of patient records exposes pa-
tients’ health information. There is evidence that a mar-
ket for individual medical records exists [46,47]. This
kind of identifiable health information can also be mon-
etized through extortion, as demonstrated recently with
hackers requesting large ransoms [48,49]. In one case,
where the ransom amount is known, the value per pa-
tient’s health information is $1.20 [49]. However, given
that minimum wage is $8.75 per hour in Ontario, at
such a low patient record value an adversary would not
be financially incented to spend more than a few mi-
nutes trying to verify a match. Consequently we can as-
sume that where the driver is the financial value of the
patient record that Mj = 1.
If the motivation is not financial then the adversary may
expend more effort and hence increase M. For example,
for a public data set the adversary may be in the mediaand doing an investigation, as in our example of the
broadcaster. The adversary may be performing a demon-
stration attack to show that records in a dataset can be re-
identified [3]. In those cases the individuals who are being
contacted may not appreciate the intrusive questions or
someone may suspect a social engineering scheme, which
means that there is a deterrent from having an M that is
too large. If we are to use known real attack examples
where verification was performed, then an M in the range
of 10 or 15 would seem reasonable.
Methods
Given the number of verification attempts, M, an adver-
sary is willing to make, the probability of verification p,
and an acceptable risk threshold τ, we provide recommen-
dations (in the Discussion Section) to the data custodian
on the minimal population class size needed to have an
acceptable risk.
But before that, in this and the following section, we
conduct a simulation to estimate the proportion of indi-
viduals in the ADE dataset (having an outcome of death)
with a high probablity of re-identification by linking to ob-
ituaries. This estimate was performed for different combi-
nations and levels of granularity of quasi-identifiers. For
the simulation, we focused on the two extreme cases of a
mildly motivated adversary, and a highly motivated one.
Datasets
We performed a simulation using mortality data from Sta-
tistics Canada for the years 1997 to 2005 [50,51]. Under
the assumption that there exists a comprehensive obituary
registry that is available to an adversary, we computed the
re-identification risk for Canadian ADE reports with death
outcomes over this period. We used the Statistics Canada
mortality data to simulate such a comprehensive obituary
dataset. We refer to this as the simulated obituary.
In total there were 1,993,351 deaths during the study
period. Statistics Canada provides two death files that are
not linked. The first reports the age at death, gender, prov-
ince, and year of death. The second file reports the prov-
ince, month, and year of death. We created 1000 simulated
obituaries by distributing the deaths in the first file by
month with the same proportions as in the second file. We
then distributed the deaths to the days within each month
using a uniform distribution. All analysis results were aver-
aged across the 1000 simulated obituaries.
The relevant outcomes in the ADE dataset were deaths,
whether they were related or not to the drug. During that
same period there were 3,482 deaths reported in the
Canadian ADE database.
The ADE dataset made available by Health Canada does
not include the province. Therefore, for every equivalence
class in a simulated obituary, we assigned the province
randomly to ADE records. This is illustrated in Figure 3
Figure 3 An example illustrating how province is assigned to
the ADE dataset from the virtual obituary file.
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obituary has five records with two deaths in Ontario, two in
Alberta, and one in Nova Scotia, and the ADE database has
three records of unknown province. We therefore assigned
the first ADE record the province according to the distribu-
tion in the obituary equivalence class (i.e., Ontario with a
probability of 0.4, Alberta with a probability of 0.4, and
Nova Scotia with a probability of 0.2). This was repeated for
the next ADE record with an adjusted probability depend-
ing on the assignment for the first ADE record, and so on.
The ADE dataset has the date of reporting. This may
not be the exact date of death. Manufacturers and distrib-
utors are required to report deaths within fifteen days for
marketed products. Therefore, when matching the ADE
dataset with the simulated obituaries, we consider deaths
within fifteen days of the reporting date to be in the same
equivalence class.
Ethics
The datasets used in this analysis were public data sets
available from Health Canada and Statistics Canada.
According to guidance received from our research eth-
ics board, no ethics review is required for studies utiliz-
ing public data sets.
Risk measurement
For each equivalence class in the simulated obituary we
computed the re-identification risk using Equation (2). If
the risk was higher than a threshold τ then we consid-
ered all of the individuals in that equivalence class in the
ADE dataset to be at an elevated risk of re-identification
by matching the ADE report with the obituary. Consider
the hypothetical example in Figure 1. Here the ADE
database only has 4 equivalence classes that are matched
to four equivalence classes in the simulated obituary.
The fifth equivalence class in the simulated obituary
(65 year old females) is not considered at all in our ana-
lysis because there are no such equivalence classes in
the ADE database. If we find that R1 > τ and R3 > τ, then
the percentage of ADE records at risk would be com-
puted as 100 f 1þf 3ð Þ f 1þf 2þf 3þf 4ð Þ
h i
. This value would
then be averaged across the 1000 simulated obituaries.Risk threshold
What should the value of τ be? Though a minimum
equivalence class size of 3 is often suggested [52-55], a
common disclosure control recommendation in practice
(ie., in data release policy and guidance documents) is to
ensure that equivalence classes have at least 5 records
[20-26,56-58]. This translates to a practical τ = 0.2, which
we will use in our analysis.
We used different values for p to reflect potentially
different challenges in verifying a match. These were 0.5,
0.7, and 0.9. We did not use values below 0.5 because
we know from the ADE dataset and the national broad-
caster example that verification is doable relatively easily,
which makes it difficult to justify a lower value for p.
For the number of attempts, Mj, we use Mj =1 for a
mildly motivated adversary, and Mj = Fj for an adversary
who will exhaust all matching records in the obituary. By
examining Equation (2), we see that Rj > p when Mj = Fj,
and therefore the inequality Rj > τ holds true. In fact, un-
less p < 0.2 an adversary that tries to verify all potential
matches will always result in a high risk of re-
identification for all records in the ADE database. There-
fore, there is no need to empirically test the case where
Mj = Fj.
Quasi-identifiers
The percentage of ADE records at risk was computed
for different combinations of quasi-identifiers at differ-
ent levels of precision. The original quasi-identifiers in-
cluded province, age at death in years, gender, and date
of reporting. Age at death was generalized to five year
intervals and ten year intervals. The date of reporting
was generalized to month and year, and only year. This
gave us a total of twelve quasi-identifier combinations.
For our simulation, we looked at these different combi-
nations of quasi-identifiers and how they affected the per-
centage of records at risk. Note that the granularity of the
quasi-identifiers affects the size of the population equiva-
lence classes and the re-identification risk as a result.
Interpretation
In the Discussion, we calculate the minimal equivalence
class size required in the obituaries that guarantees 0%
of records at risk. However, it is important to note that
previous disclosures of cancer registry data have
deemed thresholds of 5% and 20% registry members at
risk as acceptable for public release and research use
respectively [26,27].Results
The percentage of ADE deaths (averaged across the 1000
simulated obituaries) are given in Table 4. These results
assume an adversary will attempt only one verification.
Table 4 The percentage of ADE deaths that are at a high risk of re-identification by matching to an obituary for
different combinations of quasi-identifiers
Quasi-identifiers ADE records at risk (%)
Province Age at death Gender Day of report Month of report Year of report p = 0.5 p = 0.7 p = 0.9
X X X X X 1.95 3.46 5.05
X X X X 0 0 0
X X X 0 0 0
2 yr X X 0 0 0
5 yr X X 0 0 0
10 yr X X 0 0 0
X X X X X X 18.44 25.17 30.78
X X X X X 0.21 0.4 0.63
X X X X 0.12 0.24 0.39
X 2 yr X X 0.04 0.07 0.13
X 5 yr X X 0.02 0.03 0.05
X 10 yr X X 0 0 0.01
We considered age converted into a 2 year interval, 5 year interval, and a 10 year interval.
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province, the percentage of ADE deaths at risk varies
from 18.44% to 30.78% depending on the assumption
about verification probability. Therefore, under the most
lenient assumption of p = 0.5, the risk of re-identification
would still be considered high. The removal of province
does reduce the percentage of ADE deaths at risk to a
range from 1.95% to 5.05%. This is clearly a significant
reduction in risk and is quite close to the 5% limit
deemed acceptable for public disclosure.
The removal of the exact day of reporting (and having
only month and year) ensures that the percentage of ADE
records at risk is from 0.21% to 0.63%, which is very low,
even if the province field is included. In fact, that would
seem to be the most sensible approach to disclosing the
ADE data and ensuring acceptable risk. This allows the re-
tention of the province field as well as age at death in years.
Discussion
Summary
We have constructed a re-identification risk model that
mimics the behaviour of an adversary who is motivated to
varying degrees to verify potential matches, and captures
the realistic situation where the probability of verification
of a match is not always one. We then applied this model
to evaluate the risk of re-identification of post-market ad-
verse drug event data in Canada. Our analysis focused only
on cases where the outcome being reported is death be-
cause for other events the plausibility of a re-identification
is very limited.
Under the first scenario we considered, the adversary is
mildly motivated to the extent that they would be pre-
pared to make M = 1 attempts at verification. In this case,
the inclusion of the province and the full reporting datewill result in a large percentage of individuals at a high risk
of re-identification. However, the removal of the exact
reporting day, and disclosing only the month and year of
the ADE report ensures that the risk is always low.
For the second scenario where the adversary is highly
motivated and will attempt to verify all matches, we
showed that the risk of re-identification per record will
always be higher than the common 0.2 threshold (no
matter how generalized the quasi-identifiers are). The
probability of being able to verify a match, must be
smaller than 0.2 for the risk of re-identification to be
lower than the threshold.
In Table 5 we show the minimum equivalence class size.
Under the second scenario an adversary would have to
verify at most all of these matches. If we assume that the
date of reporting will not be disclosed but that province
will be, then this means that more than 6,000 matches
would have to be verified. Arguably, even if the adversary
is highly motivated, verifying that many matches is not
realistic, as it would be quite costly and hence would act
as a strong deterrent for attempting to verify all matches.
In what follows, we provide recommendations on the
quasi-identifiers level of granularity that will ensure low
re-identification risk for both the highly motivated and
mildly motivated adversaries (and hence all the motiv-
ation levels between the two). Then we provide more
specific recommendations on the minimal population
class size required for a given number of verification at-
tempts, M, a given probability of verification p, and an
acceptable risk threshold τ.
Practical recommendations
Our primary recommendation for the ADE database is
that the province field can be disclosed, but not the exact
Table 5 The minimum size of an equivalence class in a simulated obituary
Quasi-identifiers Minimum obituary
Province Age at death Gender Day of report Month of report Year of report Equivalence class size
X X X X X 263
X X X X 6514
X X X 8459
2 yr X X 16671
5 yr X X 39780
10 yr X X 79619
X X X X X X 253
X X X X X 6486
X X X X 8459
X 2 yr X X 16671
X 5 yr X X 39780
X 10 yr X X 79619
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re-identification is quite low under the scenario of a mildly
motivated adversary. For a highly motivated adversary, the
equivalence classes after implementing the above recom-
mendation are sufficiently high to act as a practical deter-
rent to attempting to verify all matches. In other words,
setting Mj = Fj is not realistic in these cases.
While our analysis was specific to the Canadian ADE
database, more general recommendations can be provided.
Specifically, policies to help reduce the probability of a suc-
cessful verification are necessary. These will help reduce
the value of p and either act as a deterrent for adversaries
to attempt verification, or reduce the chances of success if
they do attempt verification.
First, to the extent possible, the public should be dis-
couraged from divulging personal information so readily.
Also commercial and government organizations should be
discouraged from collecting non-required personal infor-
mation, for doing so makes it more acceptable for the
public to divulge personal information to complete daily
transactions. Healthcare organization staff should be edu-
cated about social engineering techniques that an adver-
sary can use to gather information about patients or
employees, and should be trained to check requests for in-
formation to ensure that they are legitimate.
Second, data custodians can generalize their data to
increase the costs of verification for an adversary. This
can create a financial deterrent. A description of how
to control the dataset equivalence class sizes through
generalization of the quasi-identifiers is described in
the next section.
Controlling re-identification risk
Re-identification risk can be controlled for the adversar-
ies with all levels of motivation. This can be achieved bycomputing the smallest value of k that all Fj can assume.
Once such a value is set, techniques described in [34]
can be used to de-identify the data set, such as the ADE
database, before its public disclosure.
Given the risk threshold τ, and given values for M and p,
the data custodian would want to manage the risk of re-
identification before disclosing the ADE or other dataset
without having to perform an extensive simulation looking
at all possible generalizations of quasi-identifiers. The the-
orem below provides the values of k that ensures that no
record in the disclosed dataset is at risk of re-identification
higher than the threshold.Theorem 1
For given values for M and p, the smallest value k that Fj
can assume is:






The proof is provided in the Additional file 1.
The relationship between M, p, and k is illustrated in
Figure 4. There is a linear relationship between M and k
whose steepness varies by p. Note that, for the persistent
adversary (high M value), k would be set sufficiently high
that it would act as a deterrent from attempting to verify
all matches.
Under the extreme circumstance, if we have a highly
motivated adversary (M has no upper limit) and if p = 1,
then even if we generalize all records in the dataset to
one class (or even if we don't release anything), the ad-
versary will call the whole population and know who has
what since p = 1.
Figure 4 The relationship between M, p, and k.
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Previous work has assumed that an adversary would
have prior knowledge which she uses to re-identify a sin-
gle record. There is also work considering prior knowledge
by the adversary about multiple records in the dataset. For
example, prior knowledge can be modeled as knowledge of
the sensitive values in a dataset that can then be used to
eliminate candidate matches [59]. This is referred to as
“corruption”. Say if there are four individuals who are
44 year old and male, but the adversary already knows that
two of them died from a car accident rather than a death
related to taking a drug, then they can be eliminated from
the matching a priori. The concept of corruption models a
different type of attack whereby the adversary already has
prior sensitive information about some of the records in an
equivalence class. Whereas in our context the adversary
only gains this sensitive information through a process of
verification: the adversary does not have prior knowledge
about any of the individuals in the disclosed database.
In other work prior knowledge can be modeled as a
belief function over the possible values of the quasi-
identifiers [60,61]. Here again this quite detailed know-
ledge is available to the adversary prior to the attack.
In our case we assume that the adversary has minimal
prior knowledge as this is similar to the context of the re-
identification attack on the ADE database. The broad-
caster did not have prior information about the drugs that
certain individuals in the ADE database have taken or
their reactions to these drugs, and did not utilize prior be-
lief functions on the variables in the ADE database. The
broadcaster did not know the identity of any of the indi-
viduals in the ADE database prior to launching an attack.
Therefore, this prior work is modeling a different
method of attack than the one that has actually oc-
curred in this case. There is no evidence of real-world
re-identification attacks that have used such extensive
prior information.Assumptions and limitations
There are two general approaches to generalization (or “re-
coding”): global and local [62-67]. With global recoding all
the values for a particular variable are generalized the same
way. For example, a date of birth is generalized to year of
birth for all records. With local recoding the generalization
levels can differ among records. For example, some records
can have a month and year generalization for the date of
birth while others can have a five year range. Our model as-
sumes global recoding, which is consistent with the most
common forms of generalization that are used in practice.
De-identified data sets with local recoding are often more
difficult to analyze because standard statistical methods can-
not be applied to them. Also, note that in the release of the
ADE database and in discussions about its de-identification
in the relevant court documents, all generalization discus-
sions and examples pertained to global recoding.
One limitation in our analysis is that we had to create
simulated obituaries. In doing so, we assumed that deaths
occur uniformly within any month of the year, although we
did account for variation in the distribution of deaths
across months.
We also assumed that comprehensive obituaries exist.
This assumption means that we have obtained results
that inflate the risk measures. To the extent that real
obituaries are incomplete, the risk of re-identification
would be lower than reported here. Therefore, our risk
results should be considered higher than they would be
in the non-ideal real world.
The choice of p is a challenge in practice. However,
given the precedents and the ease of using social engin-
eering techniques to extract information from individ-
uals, it would be prudent to set this value relatively
high. It is also relatively easy to perform a sensitivity
analysis on the choice of p to determine whether plaus-
ible values would affect conclusions drawn about the
risk of disclosing the data.
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classes. This is not necessarily true because certain equiva-
lence classes may be easier to verify. However, there is no
evidence or data to indicate which equivalence classes
would be easier, and thus is a hypothetical rather than a
real concern.
Another limitation is that our study focused on re-
identification risk from ADE reports in Canada and these
empirical results may not generalize to other jurisdictions.
In particular, the FDA is setting up a sentinel network to
collect data from 100 million patients to provide more im-
mediate, complete, and detailed information about ADEs
[68,69]. To the extent that this data will be accessible
broadly, re-identification risk assessments should be con-
sidered because this represents information on one third
of the US population, which is a much larger sampling
fraction than for the Canadian ADE database.
Conclusions
In this paper we developed a new model to measure
re-identification risk that takes into account the ad-
versary’s ability to verify matching. This is arguably a
more realistic model of how re-identification attacks
are actually performed. We then applied this model to
the re-identification of Canada’s adverse drug event
database. This analysis provided evidence-based guid-
ance on what information can be publicly disclosed
while maintaining the privacy of the data subjects.
Endnote
a There are exceptions where the disclosure is mandated
by law, e.g., for some communicable diseases, or otherwise
permitted under the discretion of the data custodian.Additional file
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